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Abstract: Holmström (1982) established that free riding behaviors are pervasive
whenever people are paid according to aggregate measures of output such as team
incentives. However, team incentives have been found to be particularly effective both in
the lab and in the field. In this paper we show, in line with Holmström (1982), that shirking
behaviors in teams are indeed pervasive. Production levels were significantly lower under
team incentives than under individual incentives while the time dedicated to on-the-job
leisure activities (Internet usage) was significantly larger under team incentives than
under individual incentives. Subsequently, we find that a very weak form of peer
monitoring (anonymous and without physical proximity, verbal threats or face to face
interactions) allowed organizations using team incentives to perform as well as those
using individual incentives. This provides strong evidence for the conjecture of Kandel and
Lazear (1992) that peer pressure may resolve the moral hazard in teams problem.
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An organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence, then, either by the
objective inducements it provides or by changing states of mind. . . . We shall call the
process of offering objective incentives “the method of incentives”; and the processes of
changing subjective attitudes “the method of persuasion.” —Barnard (1938, p. 142)
1. INTRODUCTION
Team Incentives in the Theory of Organizations
As a point of departure for the analysis of organizations and the development of an economic
theory of the firm, theorists have put forward the pervasiveness of free-riding behaviors in teams
in which it is difficult to observe and verify the contribution of each partner (Alchian and
Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)). Indeed, workers paid according to an aggregate measure of
performance such as team output are likely to exert less effort than if they were paid according to
their individual performance. A central feature of successful organizations consists of
overcoming free riding by designing effective monitoring schemes (Alchian and Demsetz
(1972)) or using budget-breaking devices aimed at threatening potential free riders (Holmström
(1982)).
At the empirical level, the evidence of free riding behavior in teams has been limited (e.g.
Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (2007), Leibowitz and Tollison (1980)). Instead, team incentives
have been found to be particularly effective both in laboratory experiments (Dohmen and Falk
(2011), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2001)) and in field studies (Dumaine (1990,
1994), Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996),
Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993)). For example,
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) show that equal sharing of production bonuses within
teams seems to stimulate cooperation, information sharing, monitoring and even mutual training,
generating a productivity increase (relative to individual incentives) despite the expected freerider problem. In a recent paper, Babcock et al. (2012) show that team incentives can outperform
individual incentives in fostering students’ attendance to the university gym Club. The authors
acknowledge the crucial role of social pressure in explaining their results.
The empirical difficulty to identify free-riding behaviors in teams is likely due to the lack of
control over crucial aspects of work teams that act as confounding factors such as peer
monitoring, interpersonal relations or implicit incentives (e.g. firing threats).
In this study, we are able to compare team and individual incentives while controlling for
team-specific features that may interfere in the empirical assessment of team incentives. We
2

study large teams (of ten members each) with the aim of recreating a realistic organizational
setting. Our experimental environment differs from previous experimental settings as it
introduces a long and real-effort work task as well as real-time access to leisure activities
(Internet browsing). We found the introduction of real-leisure alternative activities to be
pertinent as subjects were indeed willing to undertake on-the-job leisure activities for which they
were not paid by the experimenter. In particular, subjects spent 11.9% of their time browsing the
Internet when they were paid according to individual incentives.
Importantly, we report that production levels were on average 32.8% lower under team
incentives than under individual incentives. This result was driven by extensive shirking
behaviors in the team incentives treatment in which subjects spent on average 28.5% of their
time browsing the Internet. These results are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström
(1979), and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review) as they confirm the sound premise that
performance is increased by the use of high-powered incentives schemes. As we show in the
online appendix (Section A part IV), the introduction of Internet browsing as an on-the-job
leisure activity is a crucial feature of our experimental environment as incentives effects mostly
vanish in its absence.
As a second step of our analysis, we introduced a real-time monitoring technology in our
virtual organizations so as to assess whether the poor performance of team incentives could be
mitigated by peer pressure.
Supervision and Peer-monitoring in the Theory of Organizations
Supervision is an important aspect of the theory of the firm that was mentioned by preeminent
scholars as one of the raison d'être of organizations (Barzel (1982), Chandler (1992), Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) put forward the need for centralized supervision
in a context of asymmetric information between managers and their subordinates in a team
context. They stress that peer monitoring is not an efficient mechanism because the agents would
tend to shy away from monitoring activities. However, other theories view peer monitoring as a
highly-effective mechanism (Carpenter et al. (2009), Kandel and Lazear (1992)). Kandel and
Lazear stress the role of shame arising when workers produce less than the group average as an
important mechanism in understanding the effectiveness of peer pressure. Carpenter, Bowles and
Gintis (2006) emphasize the role of negative reciprocity as a behavioral mechanism leading
contributors to voluntary incur private costs to punish free riders. Evidence of such behaviors has
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been found in public good experiments (Fehr and Gächter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker
(2007)) as well as in contests between groups (Abbink et al. (2010)). Grosse, Putterman and
Rockenbach (2011) stress the popularity of peer monitoring devices in a modified version of the
public good game in which subjects could vote on whether to use a central monitor or rely on a
decentralized monitoring system (peer monitoring). Under peer monitoring, each subject decided
how much to invest in the monitoring technology which precision determined the allocation of
team profits. In particular, the proportion of the team profits which was allocated according to
individual contributions increased in the precision of the monitoring technology. The authors
found that subjects mostly relied on peer monitoring as a disciplining device challenging the idea
of Alchian and Demsetz that a central monitor is needed to avoid free riding behaviors in the
provision of monitoring.
Peer effects have been reported in a series of field experiments. For example, Sacerdote
(2001) and Zimmerman (2003) report peer effects on students’ grades among college
roommates. Falk and Ichino (2006) found that students who worked for fixed wages to stuff
envelopes performed significantly better when working in pairs than when working alone. Mas
and Moretti (2009) studied the case of supermarket cashiers and found positive peer effects on
the number of items scanned by cashiers. The authors considered workers’ visual contact and
frequency of interactions as measures of peer pressure. In a related field work, Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul (2005) found that mutual monitoring reduced fruit pickers’ productivity
when they were paid according to relative performance. The authors interpret this result as
evidence of workers being aware of the negative effect of achieving high levels of production on
their co-workers’ pay. In the field studies described previously, peer pressure was approximated
by a variety of observable measures such as visual contact, physical proximity or frequency of
interactions. In this paper, we bring anonymous real-time supervision in a controlled laboratory
environment so as to enable the experimenter to measure peer pressure with precision. In
particular, we are able to record the amount of time subjects spent watching others, the activities
which were completed by the subjects who were being watched, as well as discern the identity of
the subjects who were watching and being watched by others. Furthermore, our anonymous
supervision mechanism allows us to isolate the effects of possible cofounds that may appear in a
face to face interaction such as fear of retaliation.

4

Our peer monitoring technology was such that each team member could monitor peers’
activities at any point in time during the experiment. As a result, subjects could shape their
monitoring strategy by deciding upon which subjects to monitor and when to do so. 2 Monitors
were informed in real-time about the activities undertaken by supervisees and could therefore
identify whether they were browsing the Internet or producing for the organization. In the peer
pressure monitoring treatment, subjects were notified on their screen whenever they were being
watched by others. This feature induced social pressure which is defined by Mas and Moretti
(2009) as a case in which workers experience disutility if they are observed behaving selfishly by
their peers. In that respect, our monitoring technology was more intrusive than the mere release
of feedback about relative performance introduced in recent experimental works (Azmat and
Iriberri (2010), Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009),
Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)).
Our environment offers a unique opportunity to provide a detailed analysis of peer monitoring
activities. In the peer pressure treatment, we report that a large proportion of subjects (88.3%)
decided to monitor others. However, subjects dedicated only a small proportion of their time
(4.4%) to monitoring activities, compared with the proportion of their time subjects spent
working (82.5%) or browsing the Internet (13.1%). Yet, all subjects were being watched for an
average of 22.4% of their time. Team members shared the monitoring burden and maintained
peer pressure during the whole duration of the experiment. Another important characteristic of
the peer monitoring strategy implemented by organizational members was its unpredictability.
We find evidence of strong peer pressure effects when comparing organizations endowed
with peer monitoring and team incentives with organizations relying on team incentives alone.
Production was 47.1% higher and Internet usage was 54.1% lower under peer pressure. In
contrast to public good games with monetary punishments (Carpenter (2007a, 2007b), Fehr and
Gächter (2000)), both effort and efficiency were increased by the introduction of peer
monitoring. This was the case because subjects spent little time watching others as they shared
the monitoring burden to limit the cost of monitoring.

2

This endogenous aspect of our monitoring technology can be linked to search experiments in which subjects decide
whether to observe or not their relative performance (Burks et al. (2010), Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2006)).
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Peer monitoring combined with team incentives led to levels of performance and Internet
usage that were remarkably similar to individual incentives, despite the absence in our design of
punishments devices, communication technologies or physical proximity among subjects.
These findings confirm the theoretical conjecture of Kandel and Lazear (1992) that peer
pressure may be an effective solution to the moral hazard in teams problem identified by
Holmström (1982). In addition, we were able to answer the question of “How is peer pressure
generated? (Kandel and Lazear, 1992, p.805)”. To do so, we conducted experiments in which
organizational members could watch each other’s activities without being noticed by their peers.
We show that, in contrast to visible peer monitoring, the invisible monitoring technology did not
reduce shirking. These results indicate that effective peer monitoring crucially hinges on social
pressure.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
2.1. Virtual Organization
We develop a framework in which subjects could undertake a real-effort organizational task,
have access to Internet, and monitor other subjects’ behavior in real-time. 3
2.1.1. The Work Task
We introduce a particularly long and laborious task so as to reduce as much as possible the
role of intrinsic motivation in our environment. Indeed, subjects may like certain tasks and derive
direct utility from undertaking the activity. By using a long, repetitive and effortful task we
ensure that individual performance is mostly driven by effort considerations. We do so because
our main objective is to test standard predictions of incentives theory while abstracting from
confounding factors such as intrinsic motivation. The duration of our task as well as its intricacy
were considerably higher than in previous real-effort experiments that have reported the use of
summation tasks (Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk (2009) and Dohmen and Falk (2011)). In an early and
unmatched contribution to the real-effort literature, Dickinson (1999) designed a four-day
experiment in which subjects had to undertake a two-hour typing task. Another long real-effort
task was used by Falk and Ichino (2006) in which participants were asked to complete a fourhour mailing task. In a field experiment by Gneezy and List (2006), subjects were asked to enter
data (book references) into a computer database for six hours. In our experiment, subjects were
3

A video presentation of the software is available at http://sites.google.com/site/vopeerpressure/home/videos.

6

asked to sum up tables of 36 numbers for 1 hour and 40 minutes (see Figure O.1 in the online
appendix).
Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit while a penalty of 20 cents was
subtracted from individual production for each incorrect answer. After each subject completed a
table, the accumulated individual production was updated so that subjects knew whether their
answer was correct or not. At the end of each period, and only then, participants were informed
about the total amount of money generated by all 10 participants’ work task during the period.
2.1.2. Internet Browsing
At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the work task to the leisure
activity that consisted of browsing the Internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a
different screen. To switch from one activity to another subjects simply had to click on the
corresponding option of the drop-down menu at the bottom-right of their screens (see Figure O.2
in the online appendix). In that respect, Internet browsing introduced temptation in the spirit of
recent self-control experiments providing on-the-job distraction activities such as watching a
humorous video (Bucciol, Houser and Piovesan, 2011). The use of Internet as a tempting
alternative in the study of self-control problems has been considered by Houser et al. (2010).
Internet browsing and the work task were undertaken on different screens so that subjects
could not complete tables while being on the Internet. The Internet browser was embedded in the
software so that the experimenter could keep a record of the switching times between activities
as well as the exact amount of time subjects spent on each activity.
The introduction of Internet browsing in our virtual organizations is motivated by the
widespread use of Internet in the workplace. According to a 2005 study by American Online and
Salary.com, employees spend about 26% of their time on activities unrelated to their work
(Malachowski (2005)). Almost half of this time actually corresponds to Internet usage. In
addition, a study by Nielsen/Net Ratings report that people spend more than twice as much time
online at the office as they do at home (Farrell (2000)). Gordon (2000) argues that Internet usage
in the workplace may damage employees’ productivity (see also Young (2005, 2006)). Also, the
use of Internet represents a suitable alternative to the work task, as it is widespread among
university students and provides a wide range of activities (Jones et al. (2009).
The consideration of leisure-related issues in the experimental literature was first introduced
in the analysis of labor supply by Dickinson (1999). The objective of the author was to assess
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both income and substitution effects using laboratory experiments. Participants had to undertake
a two-hour typing task on four different days (the first day was used for training). In one of the
two treatments (the combined experiment), subjects could leave the laboratory whenever they
had achieved a certain output level. This aimed at capturing off-the-job leisure activities. Falk
and Huffman (2007) also introduced the possibility for subjects to quit the experiment when
analyzing minimum wages and workfare in the laboratory. However, it is difficult to interpret the
heterogeneity in quitting behaviors given the lack of control over subjects’ activities outside the
laboratory. Our experimental design embeds on-the-job leisure activities into the work
environment that allows the experimenter to measure the exact amount of time each subject spent
on leisure and work activities, respectively. Two related studies (Charness, Masclet and Villeval
(2010), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009)) have also introduced on-the-job leisure activities
in experimental environments by giving subjects access to magazines.
2.1.3. The Low Effort Clicking Task
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a yellow box
moving slowly from left to right at the bottom of their screen. This clicking task aimed at
representing the pay that workers obtain just for being present at their workstation regardless of
their commitment to the work task. These payments can be seen as a fixed wage. The
introduction of the clicking task allowed subjects to collect a constant flow of earnings with low
effort but without actually working dilligently at the high effort work task. Each time subjects
clicked on a yellow box they earned 5 cents, no matter how they chose to spend their time
otherwise (see Figure O.3 in the online appendix). The box appeared at the bottom of a subject’s
screen every 25 seconds whether the subject was currently working on the work task or browsing
the Internet. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of 20 minutes each, subjects could
earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 yellow boxes that appeared on the screen
during the experiment.
2.1.4. Real-time Monitoring
In the monitoring treatments, subjects were able to monitor others’ activities in real time. Our
objective was to design an environment that allows for the emergence of peer effects which were
defined by Charness and Kuhn (2011) as “…a situation where workers work, side by side, for the
same firm but do not interact in any way (except that they observe each others’ work activity.)”.
We allowed subjects to monitor their peers’ activities at any time during the experiment by
8

selecting the Watch option in the drop-down menu. In that respect, our monitoring technology
offered a unique opportunity to assess the effect of peer pressure over time and examine the
conjecture that peer effects may fade away as time passes (Falk and Ichino (2006)).
Monitoring activities had to be undertaken in a separate screen so that subjects could not
participate in the work task or the leisure activity while monitoring others, though they could
continue with the clicking task. As a result, monitoring imposed an opportunity cost on watchers
that was different in nature from the monetary cost of punishments in public good games (Fehr
and Gächter (2000)). In the monitoring screen, subjects could decide whether to monitor only a
subset or all the other subjects at the same time. Alternative monitoring technologies may be
considered in which the monitor can only monitor a subset of subjects at the same time. 4 The
information was displayed in a table, where each column showed information regarding the
activities completed by a given subject. Monitors were informed about the activities undertaken
by each subject (Internet, Work Task or Watch), the current production as well as their
contribution to the work task (in % terms) and whenever a subject summed a column or a row,
before providing a final answer for the work task (see Figure O.4 in the online appendix).
In the peer pressure treatment, subjects were notified with a message stating the experiment
ID of the watcher jointly with an eye picture whenever they were being watched (see Figure O.5
in the online appendix). We also conducted a treatment in which subjects were not notified when
they were being watched by others (invisible monitoring) so as to isolate the role of social
pressure in the peer monitoring technology. Note that social pressure, though minimal, is not
totally eliminated in the invisible monitoring treatment since workers may still feel that they are
watched by their peers even if they are not notified about it.
The monitoring technology used in the present paper allows for precise control over the
supervision activities which is difficult to obtain in the field (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul
(2005), Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)). For example, we can measure the
exact amount of time subjects were being watched by others as well as the amount of time they
spent watching others. It is also possible to identify the watchers as well as the subjects who
were being watched. The experimenter has also access to the information that was displayed on
the watchers’ screens at any given time. Importantly, our anonymous supervision mechanism

4

These more general monitoring technologies are currently under study.
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allows us to isolate the effects of possible cofounds that may appear in a face to face interaction
such as the fear of retaliation.
Another distinctive feature of our monitoring technology is that subjects could freely decide
upon their monitoring strategy. Subjects could choose who to monitor and when to do so. This
feature of the supervision technology will allow us to study subjects’ monitoring strategies.
Table 1. Summary of the treatments.
Treatment

Description

Number of
sessions (subjects)

Individual incentives
(I)

Subjects were rewarded on the work task according to
their individual production.

7 (66)

Team incentives
(T)

Subjects were rewarded on the work task by obtaining
10% of the total production of the 10 group members
in each session.
Subjects were rewarded according to team incentives.
Subjects had access to a monitoring technology that
notified them whenever they were being watched.
Subjects were rewarded according to team incentives.
Subjects had access to a monitoring technology for
which they were not notified when they were being
watched.

Peer pressure
(TP)
Invisible monitoring
(TPN)

6 (60)
6 (60)

6 (60)

2.2. Treatments
We ran four different treatments (see Table 1). In the baseline treatment, subjects were
rewarded on the work task according to their individual production (treatment I). In the second
treatment (treatment T), the total production of the 10 subjects participating in the experiment
was equally distributed among them. Our third experiment was the peer pressure treatment
(treatment TP) which was equivalent to treatment T except that all ten subjects could monitor
their peers using the technology described in the previous section. Treatment TPN was similar to
treatment TP except that organizational members were not notified on their screen when they
were being watched by another subject.
In all treatments subjects could individually obtain the full rewards ($2.40 per period) of the
clicking task with minimal vigilance and effort. The instructions for each treatment are available
online. 5
We conducted a series of additional treatments as robustness checks (see Part IV of the online
appendix). In particular, we ran two treatments which were similar to treatments I and T except
5

http://sites.google.com/site/vopeerpressure/home/instructions. Instructions for treatment TPN were the same as for
treatment TP except for slide 36 which was removed.
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for the fact that Internet browsing was not made available to subjects. We also assessed the
robustness of our results by controlling for demographic information which was collected in a
follow-up study.
2.3. Conceptual Framework
We build our conceptual framework on the moral-hazard in teams problem introduced by
Holmström (1982) and on its extension to the presence of peer monitoring which was proposed
by Kandel and Lazear (1992). We consider N workers producing a total output f (e1 , e2 ,..., eN )
which depends on each worker’s effort ei , where i ∈ {1,..., N } . Each worker i decides to allocate
her time to the following activities: work effort (ei ≥ 0) , leisure (li ≥ 0) or peer monitoring

(mi ≥ 0) .

We normalize these variables to one so that ei + li + mi = 1 . Following Holmström

(1982) and Kandel and Lazear (1992), we consider the case of homogeneous workers and
assume the same utility function for all workers. In our case, this implies the same cost of effort,
C (.) , and the same utility for Internet usage, η (.) , for all workers. It also implies the same peer

pressure function P(.) for all workers. The utility function of worker i can be expressed as
follows: U i := si f (ei ; e j ,..., eN ) − C (ei ) + η (li ) − P(ei , e0 , m−i ) , where C (ei ) stands for the cost of
effort function with C ' > 0 and C ' ' > 0 , si is the share of group production assigned to worker i
and m−i is the vector of peer monitoring activities for workers j ≠ i . Under team incentives
(treatments T, TP and TPN), si =

1
while under individual incentives (treatment I) workers are
N

paid according to their actual contribution to the group outcome. If we assume that f (.) is
separable in workers’ effort and in particular if we assume that f (ei ; e j ,..., eN ) =

si =

ei
N

∑e
k =1

N

∑e
k =1

k

then

under individual incentives. 6 In order to provide an illustration of the peer pressure

k

function we refer to the work of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) on social image. In particular,
we consider that a worker i will obtain utility (suffer a utility loss) from being watched by at least
6

Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume nonseparability in effort so as to justify the existence of partnerships and
eliminate the possibility of self-employment. In this paper, we do not aim at justifying the existence of partnerships
and simply assume separability of the utility function in effort so as to match our experimental design more closely.
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one coworker ( ∃ j ≠ i : m j > 0 ) whenever she is producing more (less) than the benchmark level
of effort e0 . In the parlance of Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), our peer pressure function
implies that workers care about their social image. Workers feel pride if they produce more than
the benchmark and feel shame if they fall short of the benchmark contribution. In order to assess
the interaction between audience effects and peer monitoring, we add to the authors’ discussion a
distinction between visible and invisible audiences. We aim at considering both the case in
which workers are aware of others’ scrutiny (treatment TP) and the case in which they are not
(treatment TPN). The degree to which the audience is visible is denoted by the parameter v
which is equal to vTP and vTPN in treatments TP and TPN, respectively. We assume that

vTP > vTPN . That is, we assume that a person is more affected by social image concerns when the
audience is visible than when it is not. We specify the peer pressure function as follows:

− P(ei , e0 , m j ) := v µ χ (ei − e0 )( N − 1)m j , where i ≠ j , µ ∈ {TP, TPN } and χ ≥ 0 captures the
extent to which worker i cares about her social image. As in Kandel and Lazear (1992), we take
into account that workers are ex-ante identical and will choose the same level of monitoring
activity m j . We derive our main predictions by using the following specification of the workers’
utility function. 7
N

U i := si , R ∑ ek , R
k =1

(1 − li ,R ) + v χ (e − e )( N − 1)m
e 2 i,R
−α
−β
R
i,R
j , R where α > 0 , β > 0 , and
0
2
2
2

R ∈ {I , T , TP, TPN } represents the experimental treatment in which worker i was involved. By

definition, m j ,T = m j , I = 0 since peer monitoring is not available in the individual incentives and
in the team incentives treatments. We obtain the following equilibrium values for work effort for
each treatment. 8

1
eI =
α +β
*

1
e =
N (α + β )
*
T

eµ

*

1
*
+ [v µ χ ( N − 1) − β ]m µ
= N
α +β

(1)

7

For simplicity of exposition, we express the utility of leisure (Internet browsing) as the opportunity cost of not
browsing the Internet ( 1 − li ).
8

We derive these calculations in the online appendix (Part II). Note that we have to impose
be strictly greater than one.
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α + β > 1 for e* I not to

Our conceptual framework which models peer pressure as the result of audience effects is
closely related to the concept of social facilitation according to which a person’s performance on
a given task is likely to be affected by the presence of others (Zajonc (1965). In particular,
Zajonc stresses that the presence of others affects performance positively for simple and well
learnt tasks. We summarize our findings in the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 (Individual incentives versus team incentives)
Production is expected to be greater and Internet usage is expected to be lower under individual
incentives than under team incentives.
Regarding the comparison of the team incentives and the peer pressure treatments, standard
incentives theory would predict no differences both in terms of production and Internet usage. In
contrast with the work task, subjects had no monetary incentives to monitor others. Peer
monitoring was a time consuming activity during which monitors had either to sacrifice work
task earnings or leisure time. As a result, in the absence of social image concerns ( χ = 0) , we
expect subjects to shy away from monitoring activities. We would then expect treatments T and
TP to lead to the same levels of production and Internet usage. However, in the presence of
concerns for social image ( χ > 0) , it follows from our theoretical framework that work
contribution in the peer monitoring treatments can be larger than in the team incentives treatment
without peer monitoring. Indeed, as long as concerns for social image are sufficiently large
(v µ χ >

*
β
) peer monitoring ( m µ > 0 in equation (1)) will lead to an increase in work effort
N −1

*

( eµ ). This prediction is stated in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Peer monitoring)
i) Production is expected to be greater and Internet usage is expected to be lower in the peer
monitoring treatments, µ ∈ {TP, TPN }, than in the team incentives treatment without peer
monitoring as long as workers are sufficiently concerned with their social image ( v µ χ >

β
N −1

).

In that case, workers are expected to dedicate part of their time to peer monitoring activities so
as to foster the effort of the other workers.
ii) Production is expected to be greater in the peer monitoring treatments than in the individual
incentives treatment for very high levels of social image concerns.

13

We should also recognize that one might expect peer monitoring activities to backfire
generating distrust among workers. Recent research has emphasized this negative aspect of
monitoring and put forward that trusting employees can lead to higher levels of effort than
intensive supervision (Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Fehr, Klein and
Schmidt (2007a, 2007b), Frey (1993)). We do not consider crowding-out of effort as our primary
hypothesis because the disciplining effect of supervision has been found to be dominant in the
absence of interpersonal relationships among workers as is the case in our experimental design
(Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Frey (1993)). In addition, crowding-out effects are likely to be
stronger in a principal-agent relationship or in any situation in which the monitor has some
authority on the supervisee’s work. In our design, we consider a multi-agent monitoring structure
in which there is no principal and no hierarchy among subjects.
Finally, our theoretical setting assumes that the impact of social image concerns is diminished
under invisible monitoring compared with the peer pressure treatment since vTP > vTPN . As a
result, we expect the peer pressure treatment to outperform invisible monitoring.
Hypothesis 3 (Peer pressure and invisible monitoring)
Production is expected to be lower and Internet usage is expected to be greater in the invisible
monitoring treatment than in the peer pressure treatment.
Interestingly, the invisible monitoring treatment will also help us assess whether any effect of
the peer monitoring technology can be accounted for by the access to continuous feedback on
others’ production levels. In particular, if the effect of peer monitoring on workers’ production
levels is driven by the access to feedback rather than to social pressure we should expect
invisible monitoring to perform as well as the peer pressure treatment. Also, the comparison of
the invisible monitoring treatment and the team incentives treatment without monitoring will
inform us on the importance of feedback in the effectiveness of peer monitoring technologies
(see Nikiforakis (2010) for the study of feedback in public good games with monetary
punishments).
2.4. Procedures
Our subject pool consisted of students from a major American university with a diverse
population. Participants were recruited by emails from a pool of more than 2,000 students who
had signed up to participate in experiments. Emails were sent on a random basis to a subset of
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the pool of students. The experiments took place in December 2010 and February 2011. In total,
246 subjects participated in the experiment, divided in 25 sessions. We ran seven sessions for
treatment I, and six sessions for each of treatments T, TP, and TPN. Ten students participated in
each session, except for two sessions of 8 students that corresponded to treatment I. The
experiment was computerized using the Virtual Organizations software proprietarily developed
for the authors. All of the interaction was anonymous.
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screens. 9 Subjects had exactly 20
minutes to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown on the laboratory screen. Three
minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor entered into the room announcing the
time remaining and handing out a printed copy of the summary of the instructions. None of the
participants asked for extra time to read the instructions. At the end of the 20-minute instruction
round, the experimenter closed the instructions file from the server, and subjects typed their
names to start the experiment. The interaction between the experimenter and the participants was
negligible.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment are computed as the sum of the
earnings in the 5 periods. Participants in treatments I, T, TP, and TPN earned on average $27.25,
$24.45, $27.10, and $24.95 respectively. This includes a $7.00 show-up fee. Experimental
sessions lasted on average two hours and fifteen minutes.
3. RESULTS
We start by comparing individual and team incentives (Hypothesis 1). We study peer
monitoring treatments (Hypotheses 2 and 3) subsequently. Additional results are provided in part
III of the online appendix while robustness checks are conducted in part IV of the online
appendix.
3.1. Team Incentives Versus Individual Incentives
3.1.1. Individual Production
We define production as the monetary amount generated by a subject’s answers on the work
task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40¢). It can be interpreted as the total
number of correct tables completed by a given subject discounted by the number of incorrect
answers. In both treatments, period production steadily increased except for the third period as is
9

Subjects were told that all screens displayed the same set of instructions.
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illustrated in Figure 1 (see Table III.1 in the online appendix for regression analyses). The
summation task considered in the current experiment was significantly longer and more complex
than in the works of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) or Erikson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) in
which no learning effects were reported. In our task, subjects could develop strategies to sum up
the 36 numbers in the table at a faster speed. For example, subjects could decide not to compute
the partial sum of rows and columns and compute only the final sum of all the numbers in the
table. As a result, it is not surprising to observe a positive trend in production levels which can be
seen as evidence of a learning effect which has been identified in long arithmetic tasks (Charness
and Campbell (1988)).
6
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Average production

5

Team
incentives

4
3
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Figure 1. Average production per period across treatments.
Average individual production per period was equal to 4.21 tables under individual incentives
compared with 2.83 tables under team incentives. This corresponds to a 48.8% production gap
between the individual incentives treatment and the team incentives treatment. Interestingly, this
gap was observed for each of the five periods.
The comparison of individual production across treatments stresses that organizations using
individual incentives significantly outperformed those using team incentives regardless of the
test we used (see Table A.1 in the appendix). 10 This finding also holds when comparing

10

We use standard t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests as well as modifications of these tests to the case of
clustered data. The clustered version of the Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using Datta and Satten test
(2005) while the clustered version of the t-test followed Donner, Birkett and Buck (1981). We aim at controlling for
the fact that individual production in a given session may be affected by group production. This correction is
especially relevant for the treatment with team incentives in which case the contributions of other group members,
displayed on a subject’s screen at the end of each period, may affect an individual’s motivation. This may have led
subjects to free ride whenever they observed an increase in group production as is the case in standard public good
games (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey, and see Table III.2 in the online appendix for further analyses).
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individual production across treatments for each of the five periods separately (see Table A.2 in
the appendix). We summarize our findings as follows:
RESULT 1 (Work task production: Individual versus team incentives).
Total production was significantly greater in the individual incentives treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.
Result 1 is not surprising in the light of incentive theory (Hypothesis 1) but constitutes an
essential step in the empirical analysis of incentives given the limited evidence of free riding
behaviors in teams. To our knowledge, this is the first time this result is established in a
controlled environment. A related analysis was conducted by Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) in
an abstract experimental setting in which the authors compared different types of group
incentives programs ranging from revenue sharing (team incentives) to target-based and teamtournament incentives. The authors report that group incentives based on competition among
teams outperform other group incentives schemes. 11 In a recent field experiment, Bandiera,
Barankay and Rasul (2012) provide a comparison of different group incentives schemes. In
particular, they study the effect of group incentives schemes on workers’ selection of their team
partners. They show that high-powered group incentives lead workers to select their teammates
on the basis of ability instead of friendship.
3.1.2. Internet Usage
We report a positive trend in Internet usage in both treatments. Internet usage increases
significantly from period 2 onwards under individual incentives while it is not until period 3 that
Internet usage took off under individual incentives (see Table III.3 in the online appendix).
Under team incentives subjects spent on average 28.5% of their time browsing the Internet
while this percentage was only equal to 11.9% under individual incentives. 12

11

In this paper, we do not study different types of group incentives schemes. Rather, we focus on team incentives
(revenue sharing) schemes. Notice that Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) did not compare individual and team
incentives. Indeed, individual incentives schemes in an abstract effort setting automatically lead subjects to choose
the efficient level of effort e*. Instead, the authors study the more interesting case of individual wage-cumsupervision mechanism. In that case, subjects knew that their decision number (abstract effort) was going to be
checked with a certain probability p. If their decision number was checked and was below e* then they received the
low wage. Otherwise, they received the high wage.
12
Circumstantially, the proportion of their time subjects dedicated to Internet under team incentives (28.5%) was
remarkably similar to the figures published in the 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com according to
which employees spend about 26.1% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)).
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We reject the hypothesis that Internet usage was identical for individual and team incentives
(see Table A.1 in the appendix). In addition, Internet usage was significantly lower under
individual incentives for each of the five periods analyzed separately (see Table A.2 in the
appendix). These findings are in line with Hypothesis 1. Also, the positive trend for Internet
usage was significantly more pronounced in the team incentives treatment compared with
individual incentives (p-value = 0.0142). This suggests that the treatment effect became stronger
over time as subjects’ fatigue and boredom set in (see Table III.4 in the online appendix).
We summarize our findings regarding Internet usage as follows:
RESULT 2 (Internet usage: Individual versus team incentives).
i) Internet usage was significantly lower in the individual incentives treatment compared with
team incentives. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.
ii) The increase in Internet usage over time was significantly more pronounced in the team
incentives treatment than in the individual incentives treatment.
Ours is the first experiment to report a precise measurement of on-the-job leisure activities
and demonstrate their significance. Related experiments have stressed the relevance of off-thejob leisure activities that were assessed by analyzing quitting behaviors (Dickinson (1999), Falk
and Huffman (2007)) but no studies have attempted to evaluate the importance of on-the-job
leisure in a controlled environment.
This finding emphasizes that, in an environment with a long and real-effort task in which
fatigue was likely to set in, high-powered incentives were very effective in bringing down
Internet usage. Indeed, subjects spent almost three times as long on Internet under team
incentives than under individual incentives. This result is consistent with incentives theory (see
Holmström (1979), and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).
The introduction of Internet as an alternative activity is a crucial feature of our environment
that may have led subjects to consider leisure activities to be as salient as the work task. Yet,
many subjects never consulted the Internet (40.9% and 11.7% under individual and team
incentives, respectively) focusing exclusively on completing the work task. Interestingly, we
show that the incentives effects identified in the current study largely vanish if we consider an
experimental environment in which subjects do not have access to on-the-job leisure activities. In
that case, the work task is the only activity available to subjects (see part IV-A of the online
appendix).
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Finally, we expect browsing the Internet and working on the task to compete for the attention
of the subjects implying a negative relationship between individual production and Internet
usage. We confirm this conjecture by reporting highly significant (p-value < 0.001) negative
correlation coefficients between individual production and Internet usage for treatment I (-0.67)
and treatment T (-0.56), respectively. Note that in addition to the work task and Internet
browsing, subjects could obtain earnings from the clicking task. As we should expect, no
significant differences were observed across treatments in this low-effort task. Subjects
successfully clicked on the box in 98% (97%) of its appearances under individual (team)
incentives (see Table III.5 in the online appendix).
We introduced peer monitoring in our experimental setting in order to assess whether the
shirking behaviors observed under team incentives could be reduced.
3.2. Peer Monitoring
We start the analysis of peer monitoring by providing general statistics on watching activities
for both monitoring treatments, with (treatment TP) and without notification (treatment TPN).
3.2.1. Watching Activities
Subjects were watched 22.4% (29.9%) of the time in treatment TP (TPN) while subjects’
dedication to monitoring activities was limited to 4.4% (5.3%) of their available time. This
occurred because most watchers, regardless of the monitoring treatment, decided to monitor all
subjects at the same time. As a result, the amount of time subjects were being watched during the
experiment was similar across subjects. In particular, subjects with different levels of
performance were being watched for the same amount of time. It was not the case that either
low- or high- performers were more likely to be watched by others, regardless of the monitoring
treatment. We support this claim by means of a regression analysis in which we introduce as
dependent variables the amount of time subjects were watching others and the amount of time
they were being watched by others (see Table III.6 in the online appendix).
On average, subjects monitored their peers 5.7 (6.9) times during the experiment for an
average duration of 46 (45) seconds per watching episode in treatment TP (TPN). It is interesting
to note that subjects were willing to dedicate a significant amount of their time to monitoring
others even in the case in which monitors could not exert peer pressure on other subjects
(treatment TPN). This suggests that, besides exerting peer pressure, subjects monitor others to

19

obtain feedback about their relative performance as well as to scrutinize others’ behavior in the
organization.
Comparing monitoring treatments, we observe no significant differences regarding the
amount of time subjects spent watching others (see Table A.3 in the appendix). However, we
find that subjects were watched significantly more often under the invisible monitoring treatment
than under the peer pressure treatment (see Table A.3). This follows from the fact that in the
invisible monitoring treatment subjects were significantly less likely to watch only a subset of
the other nine organizational members (5.1% of the watching episodes) than under peer pressure
(11.1% of the watching episodes). 13 These findings are consistent with the fact that, in treatment
TPN, monitoring is driven by the willingness to observe others’ behaviors and compare oneself
with the group while in treatment TP monitoring could be partly driven by concerns for exerting
peer pressure on all or a subset of the organizational members.
Interestingly, monitoring did not fade away over time. The proportion of their time subjects
spent watching others was equal to 4.2% (4.8%) in the first period compared to 5.6% (5.4%) in
the last period in treatment TP (TPN). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the amount of time
subjects dedicated to watching activities was the same across periods in treatment TP and in
treatment TPN. 14
Also, the proportion of subjects who did not watch any other subject did not increase over
time and remained constant at a value close to one-third in both monitoring treatments.
Considering the experiment as a whole, only 7 out of 60 (3 out of 60) of the subjects did not
spend any time monitoring their peers in treatment TP (TPN) (p-value = 0.186 for a comparison
of proportions across treatments). In our experiment, monitoring entailed an opportunity cost
since subjects who watched others had to leave the work task screen affecting their production
negatively. However, these monitoring costs were shared among team members because subjects
were paid according to team incentives. As a result, any decline in production due to monitoring
activities would affect all workers in the same magnitude. Our environment differs from the
model presented by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and tested by Grosse, Putterman and
13

In our setting, monitoring all subjects could be done at no extra cost by clicking on the monitor all button.
We ran Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to compare the average amount of time subjects spent watching others in each
period. To avoid clustering issues we analyzed watching activities at the session level. We ran a total of ten tests for
each treatment TP and TPN, and no p-values were below 0.15, except for the tests comparing average watching
times between Periods 1 and 2 (p-value = 0.094) and Periods 2 and 5 (p-value = 0.094) for treatment TP and
between Periods 2 and 3 (p-value = 0.031) for treatment TPN, giving weak support for the fact that subjects watched
others more on average in later periods.
14

20

Rockenbach (2011) in which subjects who are paid according to their individual contribution
would incur an individual cost for undertaking monitoring activities. 15
Interestingly, subjects rarely watched the same person at the same time. This occurred only in
16.7% and 17.4% of the watching episodes in treatments TP and TPN, respectively (proportion
test, p-value=0.924). It is then not surprising to report that all subjects were watched during the
experiment for at least 12 minutes (16 minutes) in treatment TP (TPN). Finally, we analyze
whether the pattern of watching activities within a period followed a random pattern by using a
random order test. 16 We analyze for each period of each of the six sessions in each monitoring
treatment (that is a total of 30 observations per treatment) whether the order of watching times
followed a random order. We find that 25 (28) out of 30 periods were characterized by random
watching times in treatment TP (TPN). We summarize our findings regarding watching activities
as follows:
RESULT 3 (Watching activities)
i) Regardless of the monitoring treatment, watching activities were limited to a small percentage
of subjects’ available time. Nevertheless, all subjects were being watched during the experiment
for an average of 22.4% and 29.9% of the duration of the experiment in treatments TP and TPN,
respectively.
ii) Regardless of the monitoring treatment, watching activities did not fade away across periods.
iii) Regardless of the monitoring treatment, the pattern of watching activities followed a random
order.
iv) The magnitude of watching activities was similar across monitoring treatments. However,
monitors were more likely to watch only a subset of subjects in treatment TP than in treatment
TPN. As a result, subjects were more likely to be watched in treatment TPN than in treatment
TP.
3.2.2. Comparison of Individual Production Across Treatments
Similarly to previous treatments, we find that individual production in the monitoring
treatments increased over time as is illustrated in Figure 2. We confirm the increase in
15

Public good games with punishments also consider the case in which the cost for sanctioning other subjects is
fully incurred by the individual punisher (Fehr and Gächter (2000)).
16
We use the random order test in STATA and we consider that the pattern of watching in a given period is not
random whenever the test rejects the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level (Swed and Eisenhart (1943)). To that
end, we define an indicator variable that takes value one if a subject was watching others in a given minute of a
given period and takes value zero otherwise.
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production across periods by running a regression of individual production on period dummies
and a trend (see Table III.7 in the online appendix).
More importantly, we find that the peer pressure treatment is characterized by significantly
higher levels of production than the team incentives treatment while no significant differences
are found between peer pressure and individual incentives treatments (see Table A.1 in the
appendix). Average production was 47.1% larger in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. Additionally, average total production under peer pressure (20.6) was
remarkably close to the case of individual incentives (21.0). These results are in line with
Hypothesis 2i. At the same time, we find no support for Hypothesis 2ii according to which
production levels in treatment TP may surpass those achieved in the individual incentives
treatment. Notice that our results hold not only for total production but also for each period
analyzed separately (see Table A.2 in the appendix). We conclude that the effect of peer pressure
did not vanish across periods since average production (4.62) in the last period was significantly
greater in the peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment (3.28). Additionally,
average production was 47.3% higher in the last two periods and 46.7% higher in the first two
periods in the peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment.
In contrast, invisible monitoring did not lead to any significant increase in either total or
period production with respect to the team incentives treatment without monitoring (see Figure
2). At the same time, invisible monitoring led to average production levels which were
significantly lower than in the peer pressure and individual incentives treatments. These findings
are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3. We summarize our findings in Result 4 below.
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Figure 2. Average production per period for all treatments.
RESULT 4 (Work task production: Peer monitoring versus team and individual incentives)
i) Total production was significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately so that
positive peer effects did not vanish over time.
ii) Total production was not significantly different between the peer pressure and the individual
incentives treatments. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.
iii) Total production was not significantly different between the invisible monitoring treatment
and the team incentives treatment without monitoring. This result also holds when analyzing
each period separately.
iv) Total production was significantly lower in the invisible monitoring treatment than in the
peer pressure treatment. This result mostly holds when analyzing each period separately.
The introduction of peer pressure in our experimental design appeared to be a very effective
tool that permitted organizations using team incentives to reach efficient levels of production. 17
This result is practically relevant for managers who usually possess limited information about
individual contributions, and as a result, cannot rely on individual incentives schemes. The
absence of any positive effect on production levels in the invisible monitoring treatment suggests
that social pressure is a crucial element of the effectiveness of the monitoring technology. We
conducted additional analyses and showed that being watched by others in a given time span of
five minutes increased one’s own production in the next five to ten minutes in the peer pressure
17

We interpret the level of production obtained under individual incentives as the efficient level.
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treatment (see Table III.8 in the online appendix). At the same time, watching others in a given
time span of five minutes did not affect one’s own production in the following minutes.
Evidence of positive peer effects has been identified in field studies (Falk and Ichino (2006),
Mas and Moretti (2009)), but none of these works have examined peer monitoring as a
mechanism to resolve free riding in teams. It is also interesting to observe that we obtained
strong peer monitoring effects under anonymity and in the absence of monetary punishments. It
is indeed well known that punishments can be very effective in increasing contributions in public
good games (Fehr and Gächter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)).
Notice that in field studies such as the one designed by Mas and Moretti (2009), workers were
not anonymous and could potentially face retaliation for non-cooperative behaviors. In our
design, the interaction between subjects was anonymous so as to prevent any form of retaliation
after the experiment. In contrast to field studies (Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti
(2009)) and public good games with threats (Masclet et al. (2003)), subjects were not allowed to
communicate in our experiment. The effectiveness of our peer monitoring technology did not
rely on physical proximity, verbal threats or face to face interactions. Instead, subjects remained
seated at their workstation while monitoring others. Supervisees simply received a notification
on their screen that they were currently being watched by another subject (treatment TP). The
fact that our monitoring technology was highly effective despite the absence of physical
proximity and face to face communication is especially relevant given the growing interest for
virtual monitoring devices within firms. A large number of programs such as Spectorsoft, Virtual
Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are already available to monitor employees’
activities. An early account of computer-based monitoring systems was considered in Chalykoff
and Kochan (1989). Our findings are in line with empirical evidence suggesting that mutual
monitoring in work groups has been a decisive factor in the success of low-powered firm-wide
incentives schemes as is described in the case of Continental Airlines (Knez and Simester
(2001)).
In contrast to other supervision mechanisms, peer monitoring does not seem to induce
crowding-out of effort which has been reported in recent experimental works (Dickinson and
Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Frey (1993)). These authors stress that supervision
may be perceived as a signal of distrust and, as a result, undermine workers’ effort. Frey (1993)
as well as Dickinson and Villeval (2008) put forward that the crowding-out effect that results
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from monitoring activities dominates its disciplining effect when there exist interpersonal
relationships between managers and employees whereas the opposite tends to be true in the
absence of such relationships. In that respect, our findings are consistent with the works of Frey
(1993) and Dickinson and Villeval (2008) since our experimental design is characterized by the
absence of interpersonal relationships among workers. Also, crowding-out effects are likely to be
more relevant in an organizational structure characterized by a hierarchy. In the current setting,
we consider the case of an organization without hierarchy in which all workers had the same
roles.
3.2.3. Comparison of Internet Usage Across Treatments
Peer monitoring had a considerable impact on Internet usage (see Figure 3). 18 The average
proportion of time subjects spent on Internet was significantly lower in the peer pressure
treatment (13.1%) than in the team incentives treatment (28.5%). This difference in Internet
usage was significant whether considering total Internet usage or Internet usage per period (see
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix). Interestingly, we find slightly significant differences in
Internet usage between the invisible monitoring treatment (19.8%) and the team incentives
treatment (28.5%). This supports the conjecture that social pressure may not be fully eliminated
in the invisible monitoring treatment. Subjects may refrain from using the Internet so as to avoid
being caught by an invisible monitor. Nevertheless, Internet usage was significantly lower in the
peer pressure treatment than under invisible monitoring.
The evolution of Internet usage was remarkably similar for the peer pressure and the individual
incentives treatments (see Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix). By contrast, internet usage was
significantly higher under invisible monitoring (19.8%) than under individual incentives (11.9%).
Similarly to previous treatments, we identify a positive trend in Internet usage for both
monitoring treatments (see Table III.9 in the online appendix). The proportion of time subjects
dedicated to Internet in treatment TP [TPN] in the first two periods was only 7.7% [9.7%] on
average compared with 16.7% [26.4%] in the last three periods.

18

The results reported in this section are similar if we analyze working time (time spent on the work task) rather
than Internet usage (see Tables A.1 and A.2). Using working time instead of Internet usage allows us to control for
the fact that monitoring activities may have been used by subjects as an alternative leisure activity. Indeed, one may
argue that the low Internet usage in peer monitoring treatments is due to the substitutability between monitoring and
Internet activities.
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Figure 3. Average Internet usage (in %) for all treatments across periods.
In addition, we analyze whether knowing that they were being watched affected subjects’ use
of the Internet during the experiment. In particular, we show that in the peer pressure treatment,
subjects were less likely to switch from the work task to the Internet if they had been watched by
others in the previous five minutes (see Table III.10 in the online appendix). In sum, the
introduction of peer monitoring in our experimental design brings down Internet usage. This is an
important finding given the growing concern for cyber-slacking (Malachowski (2005), Young
(2006)). We summarize our findings as follows:
RESULT 5 (Internet usage: Peer monitoring versus team and individual incentives)
i) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment than in the team
incentives treatment. Also, Internet usage was marginally higher in the invisible monitoring
treatment than in the team incentives treatment.
ii) Internet usage was not significantly different between the peer pressure and the individual
incentives treatments. However, Internet usage was significantly higher in the invisible
monitoring treatment than in the individual incentives and peer pressure treatments.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we develop a software for the analysis of organizational issues in the laboratory.
The design of such experimental environment may be seen as a pertinent element in the
development of Experimental Organizational Economics (Camerer and Weber, 2012, p.215). In
particular, we incorporated several features of existing firms in a virtual organization by allowing
subjects to allocate their time between a real-effort task that created value for the organization and
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a real-leisure activity. We considered the most decentralized form of organizations in which no
hierarchies existed and all subjects had the same role. This represented a natural starting point in
our effort to identify elements that lead to organizational success.
As a first step, we compared organizations using team and individual incentives in order to
assess the relevance of incentives effects in our virtual organizations. We found that individual
incentives led to significantly higher levels of production and significantly lower levels of
Internet usage than team incentives. These findings confirmed that implementing high-powered
incentives schemes is an important factor of organizational success consistently with theoretical
research (Holmström (1979), see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).
We studied peer monitoring as an example of mechanism that may allow organizations to
recover the efficiency loss provoked by the use of weak incentives. We found that using peer
monitoring devoid of punishment in combination with team incentives allowed organizations to
reach production levels that were as high as in the case of individual incentives. In contrast to
public good games with punishments, both effort and efficiency were increased by the use of peer
monitoring. To our knowledge, ours is the first controlled experiment showing that peer
monitoring can offset the loss in efficiency resulting from the use of low-powered incentives
schemes. Peer monitoring was particularly effective because subjects spent a limited amount of
time watching others while sharing the monitoring burden so that all subjects were being watched
at least once during the experiment. It is as if people possessed natural skills for peer monitoring
and understood both its positive effect on productivity as well as the negative consequences of its
intensive use.
This is good news for most organizations that cannot rely on precise measures of individual
contributions. Peer monitoring is traditionally seen as a decisive advantage of organizations
where its effectiveness usually relies on face to face and repeated interactions among parties that
are inherent to the organizational environment (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), Falk and
Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)). Interestingly, the implementation of virtual monitoring
devices of the type used in our study may mitigate the comparative advantage of traditional
organizations vis-à-vis virtual organizations and other decentralized organizational structures.
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6. APPENDIX
Table A.1. P-values for statistical tests
assessing differences in production and Internet usage across treatments
Clustered
t-test

Clustered
Wilcoxon
rank-sum
test

t-test

Wilcoxon
rank-sum
test

t-test
(group
averages)

Wilcoxon
rank-sum
test
(group
averages)

Production

0.002

0.009

0.002

0.003

0.004

0.012

Internet
usage 19

<0.001

0.008

<0.001

<0.001

0.012

0.022

Production

0.019

0.049

0.008

0.015

0.046

0.045

0.003

0.010

<0.001

<0.001

0.019

0.041

0.035

0.094

0.015

0.042

0.070

0.093

0.866

0.712

0.860

0.751

0.832

0.628

0.728

0.754

0.725

0.828

0.678

0.534

0.114

0.058

0.118

0.018

0.127

0.138

0.009

0.024

0.009

0.013

0.018

0.022

Treatment I
vs.
Treatment TPN

Production
Internet
usage
Working
time

0.042

0.047

0.036

0.014

0.066

0.101

0.001

0.005

0.001

<0.001

0.007

0.005

0.687

0.727

0.680

0.738

0.696

0.688

Treatment T
vs.
Treatment TPN

Production
Internet
usage
Working
time

0.110

0.114

0.059

0.066

0.149

0.240

0.531

0.898

0.463

0.894

0.550

0.394

0.054

0.099

0.027

0.044

0.088

0.132

Treatment TP
vs.
Treatment TPN

Production
Internet
usage
Working
time

0.097

0.067

0.099

0.022

0.129

0.310

0.070

0.060

0.072

0.023

0.092

0.240

Treatment I
vs.
Treatment T

Treatment T
vs.
Treatment TP

Internet
usage
Working
time
Production

Treatment I
vs.
Treatment TP

19

Internet
usage
Working
time

Working time p-values are identical to Internet usage, as there are no other activities available in these treatments.
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Table A.2. P-values for clustered t-tests (clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) assessing
differences in production and Internet usage per period across treatments
Period 1
Treatment I
vs.
Treatment T

Production
Internet usage
Production

Treatment T
vs.
Treatment TP

Internet usage
Working time
Production

Treatment I
vs.
Treatment TP

Internet usage
Working time
Production

Treatment I
vs.
Treatment TPN

Internet usage
Working time
Production

Treatment T
vs.
Treatment TPN

Internet usage
Working time
Production

Treatment TP
vs.
Treatment TPN

Internet usage
Working time

0.025
(0.029)
0.003
(0.021)
0.012
(0.028)
0.034
(0.128)
0.383
(0.280)
0.755
(0.778)
0.283
(0.187)
0.003
(0.003)
0.198
(0.185)
0.405
(0.230)
0.007
(0.017)
0.325
(0.072)
0.040
(0.129)
0.479
(0.522)
0.096
(0.176)
0.941
(0.895)
0.883
(0.839)
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Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Period 5
0.026
(0.028)
0.002
(0.019)
0.061
(0.124)
0.011
(0.032)
0.049
(0.332)
0.900
(0.639)
0.438
(0.785)
0.063
(0.058)
0.007
(0.020)
0.046
(0.104)
<0.001
(0.003)
0.779
(0.987)
0.073
(0.188)
0.436
(0.631)
0.043
(0.087)
0.265
(0.226)
0.076
(0.085)

0.025
(0.043)
0.024
(0.050)
0.060
(0.094)
0.044
(0.083)
0.144
(0.560)
0.757
(0.819)
0.874
(0.490)
0.341
(0.058)
0.052
(0.075)
0.058
(0.069)
0.005
(0.008)
0.816
(0.900)
0.533
(0.390)
0.976
(0.468)
0.111
(0.122)
0.100
(0.160)
0.072
(0.152)

0.006
(0.025)
0.006
(0.013)
0.039
(0.095)
0.008
(0.021)
0.045
(0.121)
0.959
(0.932)
0.963
(0.747)
0.456
(0.097)
0.037
(0.065)
0.121
(0.081)
0.020
(0.007)
0.652
(0.723)
0.233
(0.168)
0.616
(0.916)
0.108
(0.156)
0.127
(0.146)
0.116
(0.092)

0.004
(0.020)
<0.001
(0.002)
0.035
(0.084)
0.001
(0.007)
0.025
(0.047)
0.581
(0.537)
0.842
(0.265)
0.192
(0.011)
0.012
(0.028)
0.072
(0.021)
0.009
(0.003)
0.744
(0.812)
0.102
(0.022)
0.418
(0.813)
0.069
(0.099)
0.106
(0.148)
0.128
(0.105)

Table A.3. P-values associated with the treatment dummy
capturing differences across monitoring treatments.
Watching
time

Length of
watching
episodes

Proportion of
watching episodes
for which only one
(all) subject(s) is
monitored

Amount of
time
being watched

Number of times
a subject is
watched

Regression type

Tobit with
random
effects

Tobit with
random
effects

Probit with random
effects

Tobit with
random effects

Poisson with
random effects

P-value
associated with
the treatment
dummy

0.165

0.573

0.041
(0.075)

0.000

0.000

All regressions are completed at the minute level and all include a trend. These results are robust to the cases of the
5-minute analysis as well as to the case of the analysis per period.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
PART I. SCREENSHOTS

Figure O.1. Example of table summation for the work task.

Figure O.2. Embedded Internet screen.

Figure O.3. The clicking task.
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Figure O.4. Monitoring screen with a zoom on subject B13.

Figure O.5. Notification when a subject is being watched.
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PART II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We solve the model by maximizing the utility function of worker i ∈ {1,..., N } with respect to
work effort ei for treatment I and treatment T. The derivations for equilibrium work effort in the
case of treatments I and T are trivial. For treatments where monitoring is available (TP and TPN),
we also maximize the utility function with respect to mi as follows:
N

Max U i := si , µ ∑ ek , µ − α
ei , mi , µ

k =1

(ei ,µ + mi ,µ ) − v χ (e − e )( N − 1)m
e 2 i ,µ
−β
µ
i ,µ
0
j ,µ
2
2
2

s.t 0 ≤ ei + mi ,µ ≤ 1 , where µ ∈ {TP, TPN }

[1]

For i ≠ j , the first order conditions of [1] are:
1
− β mi , µ + v µ χ ( N − 1) m j , µ
∂U i
*
N
= 0 ⇔ eµ =
∂ei
α +β
2
vµ χ
∂U i
( N − 1) v µ χ
1
( N − 1) m j , µ
= 0 ⇔ mi*, µ =
−
−
αβ
αN
α
N
∂mi , µ

As
mµ =
*

a
1
αN

result,

in

a

symmetric

equilibrium,

it

follows

that

mi*, µ = m *j , µ = m µ*

and

 vµ χ

1
( N − 1) 2 − 1
+ v µ χ ( N − 1) − β mµ*

β

 and e * = N
.
µ
α +β
vµ χ
1+
( N − 1)

[

]

α

*
As a result, as long as v µ χ > β then both m µ * > 0 and e µ > 0 . Also, there exists a vector of

N −1

parameters (α , β , v µ , χ ) such that an equilibrium exists in which ( m µ * , e µ * ) ∈ (0,1) . This is the
*

*

*

*

*
case as long as v µ* χ * > β

N −1

and α * is sufficiently high. In that case, the work effort under

1
+ β * m µ*
treatment TP can be larger than under individual incentives as long as v µ* χ * > N
.
N −1
∂m µ*
∂e µ*
It follows from equilibrium values of work effort and monitoring that
> 0 and
> 0.
∂χ
∂χ
∂m µ*
∂e µ*
Also,
< 0 and
< 0.
∂β
∂β
1−
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PART III. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 20
Table III.1. Tobit regression with random effects for individual production per period
(Treatments I and T)
Regression 1
Regression 2
Treatment I
Treatment T
Treatment I
Treatment T
Intercept
Trend
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4

2.542***
1.207***
1.278***
1.711***

1.101**
1.003**
0.924**
1.211***

2.395***
0.477***
-

1.044**
0.336***
-

Period 5

2.151***

1.592***

-

-

Number of
observations
and Log
likelihood

n = 330

n = 300

n = 330

n = 300

66 Left-censored

101 Left-censored

66 Left-censored

101 Left-censored

-709.6

-557.4

-711.1

-711.0

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

We confirm that period production stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the
coefficient associated with Period 2 and Period 3 dummies (p-value = 0.8676).

Table III.2. Tobit regression with random effects for individual production per period
Treatment T
Treatment I
Intercept
-0.983
2.49***
Trend
0.147
0.336*
21
Group production in (t-1)
0.597*
-0.009
Group production in (t-1) ×
Dummy greater than group average in (t-1) 22
Dummy greater than group average in (t-1)
Number of observations
and Log likelihood

-0.908**

-0.03

4.675***
n = 240

0.789
n = 264

76 Left-censored

45 Left-censored

-451.4 (Prob>χ²)<0.001

-569.6 (Prob>χ²)=0.103

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

20

Note that the results presented in this section are robust to using linear regressions instead of tobit regressions or
using clustered standard errors instead of (or in addition to) random effects. These results are available upon request.
21
Group production excludes a given subject’s individual production so as to avoid endogeneity issues.
22
This dummy variable takes a value of one if a given subject produces strictly more than the average of the other
group members in a given period.
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Table III.3. Tobit regression with random effects for Internet usage per period
(Treatments I and T)
Regression 1
Regression 2
Treatment I
Treatment T
Treatment I
Treatment T
Intercept
Trend
Period 2
Period 3
Period 4

0.029
0.670
2.448***
2.766***

0.730
2.463***
4.125***
4.799***

-0.366
0.661***
-

0.368
1.196***
-

Period 5

2.253***

4.786***

-

-

Number of
observations
and Log
likelihood

n = 330

n = 300

n = 330

n = 300

8 Right-censored

23 Right-censored

8 Right-censored

23 Right-censored

-921.3

-930.2

-926.5

-933.5

(Prob>χ²)=0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

Table III.4. Tobit regression with random effects for Internet
usage per period in Treatments I and T
Intercept

0.578

Trend

1.178***

Treatment
(Dummy that takes value
one if treatment is I)
Trend×Treatment

-1.223
-0.510**
n = 630

Number of observations
and Log likelihood

31 Right-censored

-1882.7 (Prob>χ²)<0.001

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.
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Table III.5. Clicking task performance and timing across treatments
Clicking task

Treatment I

Treatment T

Treatment TP

Treatment TPN

Success rate

98%

97%

99%

99%

P-value clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test
vs. Treatment T

0.616

-

-

-

vs. Treatment TP

0.475

0.784

-

-

vs. Treatment TPN

0.460

0.342

0.579

-

Success rate: Average proportion of the 240 yellow boxes subjects had clicked before they disappear from the screen.

Table III.6. Tobit regressions with random effects for watching activities in a given period as a
function of production in the previous period (Treatment TP)
Dependent variable:
Time being watched
Time spent watching
Treatment TP Treatment TPN Treatment TP
Treatment TPN
Intercept
21.965***
27.179***
5.903***
6.688***
Individual production
0.021
0.181
-0.075
-0.091
in the previous period
n = 240
n = 240
n = 240
n = 240
No. of observations
70 Left-censored
70 Left-censored
70 Left-censored
70 Left-censored
Log likelihood
-381.5
-590.9
-434.9
-608.9
(Prob>χ²)=0.258
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

(Prob>χ²)=0.570
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(Prob>χ²)=0.177

(Prob>χ²)=0.194

Table III.7. Tobit regression with random effects for individual production per period
(Treatment TP and TPN)
Regression 1
Regression 2
Treatment TP Treatment TPN Treatment TP
Treatment TPN
Intercept
2.826***
1.516**
2.609***
1.104*
Trend
0.356***
0.288**
Period 2
0.675
0.144
Period 3
0.720*
0.182
Period 4
1.433***
0.819**
Period 5
1.405***
1.098***
n = 300
n = 300
n = 300
n = 300
No. of observations
95 Left-censored
70 Left-censored
70 Left-censored
95 Left-censored
-545.3
-618.0
-618.8
Log likelihood
-545.9
(Prob>χ²)=0.004
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

(Prob>χ²)=0.026

(Prob>χ²)=0.004

(Prob>χ²)=0.002

In Table III.8, we use a 5-minute time frame to assess the impact of watching activities on realtime production. The independent variables related to watching activities are referred to as
Watching and Being watched. These variables measure the amount of time (in seconds) that a
subject spent watching others (Watching) and the amount of time (in seconds) a subject was
watched (Being watched) by at least one subject in a given time span of five minutes. We
introduce independent variables with lags so as to mitigate possible endogeneity issues. 23 We
include a trend as independent variable so as to control for the steady increase of production
across periods. 24-25

23

Endogeneity issues may arise if we introduce the current amount of time subjects spent watching others as well as
the current amount of time they were being watched by others as independent variables. Indeed, one may expect that
individual production could cause changes in watching behaviors. For example, subjects with low levels of
production may feel ashamed (Kandel and Lazear (1992)) and decide to avoid consulting the performance of others.
24
Similar results are obtained when controlling for beginning or end of period effects. For example, the nature of
our results is unchanged when introducing in our regression analysis a dummy variable that takes value one if the
five minute time span corresponds to the first (last) five minutes of the period.
25
A number of other specifications have been considered such as including up to three lags in the independent
variables or adding group production in the previous period as regressors. These specifications gave similar results.
We also used dynamic panel data models with Arellano-Bond (1991) estimation technique. However, this estimation
technique was not successful in fully eliminating residual autocorrelation as we may expect given the limited
number of instrumental variables at our disposal. Finally, note that the results are robust to using linear regressions
instead of tobit regressions or using clustered standard errors instead of (or in addition to) random effects. These
results are available upon request.
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Table III.8. 26 Tobit regression with random effects for individual production in
a 5-minute time span
Coefficients
Intercept
-0.803***
Being watched in t-1
0.001
Being watched in t-2
0.002***
Watching in t-1
-0.001
Watching in t-2
0.001
Trend
0.066***
Number of
n = 1080
observations
398 left-censored
and Log likelihood
Log likelihood = -1324.595, Prob > χ² = 0.000
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

The delay in the impact of watching activities can be accounted for by the time subjects needed
to produce a table (4 minutes and 3 seconds on average) in order to increase their individual
production. Furthermore, subjects who responded positively to peer monitoring by switching
from Internet browsing to the work task may have needed an additional amount of time to return
their concentration to the work task.
Table III.9. Tobit regression with random effects for Internet usage per period
(Treatment TP and TPN)
Regression 1
Regression 2
Treatment TP
Treatment TPN
Treatment TP
Treatment TPN
Intercept
1.191*
1.178
0.657
0.859
Trend
0.563***
1.056***
Period 2
0.722
1.600**
Period 3
2.188***
4.425***
Period 4
2.245***
4.279***
Period 5
2.019***
3.930***
n = 300
n = 300
n = 300
n = 300
No. of
observations
Log likelihood

2 Right-censored

12 Right-censored

-813.4

-900.7

(Prob>χ²)<0.001
(Prob>χ²)<0.001
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

2 Right-censored

12 Right-censored

-818.7

-907.3

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

We also confirm that period production stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated
with Period 2 and Period 3 dummies (t-test, p-value=0.916 and p-value=0.926 for Treatments TP and TPN,
respectively).
26

An independent variable accounting for the number of watchers is not statistically significant when introduced in
the specification of the regression. This may be due to the fact that the information on the number of watchers was
not made particularly salient. In case a subject was watched by more than one person, the following indication was
printed on the screen: “more than one subject is watching you”.
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We assessed whether being watched in a given 5-minute time span led subjects to switch to the
work task screen in the following five minutes. We run a Logistic regression where the
dependent variable Work task is a dummy variable that takes value one if the corresponding
subject was on the Work task screen in a given 5-minute time span and zero otherwise (see Table
III.10). We find that, the more time a subject was being watched in a given 5-minute time span
the more likely he or she was to be on the work task screen in the following five minutes. This is
the case since the coefficient associated with Being watched is positive and significant.
Table III.10. Logistic regression with random effects
(Treatment TP)
Dependent variable:
Work task in t
Intercept

5.702 ***

Being watched in t-1

0.008***

Individual production in t-1

0.769***

Trend (Period)

-0.601***

Dummy Minute 6 to 10
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0.148

Dummy Minute 11 to 15

-0.893*

Dummy Minute 16 to 20

-1.191**

No. of observations

n = 1140
-172.568

Log likelihood

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

Reference
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991): “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” The Review of Economic Studies,
58, 277-297.
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The Minute variables are dummy variables that take value one for a given time frame of five minutes. We use
dummy variables for each time frame of five minutes so as to control for the rising use of Internet within a given
period.
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PART IV. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
A- INCENTIVES EFFECTS IN THE ABSENCE OF INTERNET BROWSING
We conducted two additional treatments so as to assess the robustness of the incentives effects
established in Result 1 according to which team incentives underperform individual incentives.
To that end, we recruited a total of 127 subjects to compare production levels under team
incentives (60 subjects) and individual incentives (67 subjects) in a context in which Internet
browsing was not available to subjects. We find that incentives effects were much more limited
in the case in which Internet browsing was not available compared with the case in which it was
available. In particular, in the absence of the Internet browsing option, average production levels
were only 28.1% larger under individual incentives (21.8) than under team incentives (17.0).
These differences are only marginally significant. 28 Remember that in the case in which Internet
browsing was available, differences in average production levels were substantial (48.8%) and
highly significant (p-value < 0.01). These results suggest that introducing Internet browsing as an
on-the-job leisure alternative is a crucial feature of our environment that allows us to identify
incentives effects which may otherwise be largely underestimated or even fail to be observed
(Dohmen and Falk (2011), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2001)).

B- SURVEY
We conducted robustness checks for our treatment effects controlling for subjects’ ability
levels and demographic information such as age, gender and working experience. To do so, we
invited our subjects to come back to the laboratory and participate in a follow-up study in which
we measured subjects’ arithmetic skills and gathered demographic information. We invited the
186 subjects who were involved in treatments I, T and TP to participate in a one-hour survey. 29
A total of 111 participants (60% of the initial sample) ranging from 18 to 28 years old (mean=
20.35, s.d =1.97) came back to answer the survey, 52 of which were female. The subjects who
came back were distributed across the three treatments (37, 31 and 43 students in treatments I, T
and TP, respectively).

28

The p-values for the Wilcoxon (clustered) rank sum test were equal to 0.0734 (0.0967) while p-values for the ttest (clustered t-test) were equal to 0.0322 (0.0307).
29
These invitations were sent on average three months after subjects’ initial participation in any of the three
treatments.
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No significant differences were found in average production levels between the subset of
subjects who came back for the follow-up survey (19.6) and the subjects (17.6) who did not
come back. This is shown in the following regression.
Table IV.1. Tobit regression with random effects.
(Treatment TP)
Dependent variable:
Total production
Intercept

16.394***

Survey Dummy

1.972

Number of observations

n = 186
-681.079

Log likelihood

(Prob>χ²)=0.389
Survey Dummy takes value 1 if a subject participated in the follow-up survey, and 0 otherwise.
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

In the subset of subjects who came back for the follow-up study, the proportion of subjects
who were in the top three performers of their experimental session (30 out of 111) in the initial
experiment was the same as the proportion of subjects who were in the bottom three (30 out of
111). Also, these proportions were not different from 30% which is the proportion of top three
and bottom three subjects in our initial experiments (χ² = 1.635, p-value = 0.441).
In the survey, subjects had to answer questions related to demographics, personality traits and
arithmetic skills. In particular, following Dohmen and Falk (2011), we measured subjects’
summation skills in a five-minute incentivized exercise which was similar to the work task in the
current experimental design. 30
We categorized subjects as low-ability workers whenever their performance on the arithmetic
task was lower than the median performance (n=56) while high-ability workers were
characterized by performance levels which were greater than or equal to the median performance
(n=55). We then define Arithmetic skills as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a subject is
categorized as being a high-ability worker and takes value 0 otherwise. We include treatment
dummies in our regression which take value 1 if a subject had previously participated in the
corresponding treatment and value 0 otherwise. We were able to confirm the significance of our
treatment effects (see Table IV.2).

30

Subjects earned lottery tickets according to their performance on the task. A lottery-prize of 400$ was paid to a
single winner among all participants. The lottery prize was known to all participants.
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TABLE IV.2. Tobit regression with random effects for individual production
and internet usage with respect to demographic variables.
Dependent variable:
Intercept

Individual Production
-3.228

Internet usage
7.014

Treatment I

9.071***

-18.150***

Treatment TP

9.411***

-18.083***

Arithmetic skills

5.891**

1.340

Gender

0.073

0.929

Age

0.684

-2.115

Working experience

4.165

-0.648

No. of observations
Log likelihood

n = 111
-393.8

n = 111
-1699.8

(Prob>χ²)=0.005
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

We also studied treatment effects for low- and high- ability subjects separately. We show that
for low-ability subjects treatment effects were associated with a decrease in Internet usage rather
than an increase in production. For high-ability subjects, treatment effects were associated with
both a decrease in Internet usage and an increase in production (see Tables IV.3 and IV.4).
TABLE IV.3. Tobit regression with random effects for individual production
across ability levels.
Low-ability subjects
High-ability subjects
Intercept
7.283
-11.943
Treatment I
4.704
12.398**
Treatment TP
5.149
10.794**
Gender
0.645
-0.058
Age
0.243
1.374
Working experience
1.972
5.485
n = 55
n = 55
Number of observations
-185.8
-205.8
Log likelihood

(Prob>χ²)=0.872
*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.
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(Prob>χ²)=0.019

TABLE IV.4. Tobit regression with random effects for internet usage across
ability levels.
Low-ability subjects
High-ability subjects
Intercept
-24.482
49.208*
Treatment I
-8.969
-27.436***
Treatment TP
-13.061**
-21.175***
Gender
0.747
-4.664
Age
2.169**
-0.884
Working experience
1.320
-0.143
n = 56
n = 56
Number of observations
-824.2
-871.6
Log likelihood
(Prob>χ²)=0.080

(Prob>χ²)<0.001

*p -value<.10, ** p-value<.05, and *** p-value<.01.
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